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We take great pleasure in announcing the election to our
Editorial Board of the following: From the Class of 19o5,
Warren Francis Cressy, Hartford, Conn.; Isaac Stiles Hopkins,
Jr., Athens, Ga.; Ira W. Jones, Allison, Iowa. From the Class
of x9o6, .Seth Weaver Baldwin, Naugatuck, Conn.; Birdsey
Erskine Case, New Haven, Conn.; Thomas Fitzgerald Porter,
Jr., Natchitoches, La.; Matt Savage Walton, Lexington, Ky.
THE FELLOW SERVANT DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS.
Probably no department of American law is in greater con-
fusion than that relating to the liability of the master for
injuries to the servant. And while the rule is well established
that the master will be exempt from liability arising from the
negligence of fellow servants in the same line of employment,
the courts have differed widely as to what constitutes a fellow
servant within the scope of the doctrine. It has generally been
held that the master will be liable where he has so far intrusted
the management of his affairs to another as to make him prac-
tically the vice-principal, or alter ego, of himself and the courts
of a few states have attempted to confine the relation of fellow
servant to those employed in the particular distinct depart-
ment where, as in railroad corporations, the different employ-
ments comprised are vast and diversified. But the majority of
the courts have displayed a tendency to confine both limitations
within very narrow bounds, and to make the real test whether
the risk is one, which, under all the circumstances of the case,
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the servant can fairly be presumed to have assumed. Cooley on
Torts, 637. In all the American courts the subject is involved
in such confusion that a logical arrangement of principles can
only be hoped for after many years of adjudication.
In this connection the recent case of Northern Pacific Railway
Company v. Dixon, 24 Sup. Ct. 683, is of interest in illustrating
the diversity of view entertained by even so distinguished a
tribunal as the Supreme Court of the United States. A brief
statement of facts is necessary to the understanding of the
case. Certain trains of the defendant were operated inde-
pendently of the regular time table by direct telegraphic orders
from the train despatcher. While a local operator was asleep
one of these trains passed his station without his knowledge, and
subsequently, in answer to the despatcher's inquiry, he reported
that it had not passed. In consequence, the despatcher released
a train going in the opposite direction, and in the ensuing colli-
sion the plaintiff's decedent, a fireman, was killed.
In the consideration of the case the majority of the Supreme
Court allowed their decision to rest wholly upon whether the
telegraph operator was, or was not, a fellow servant of the fire-
man. While admitting that both the vice-principal and depart-
ment theories were, in limited form, recognized by the Federal
courts (Ross Case, i 2 U. S. 377), they denied its application
to the case at bar. And having decided that the operator was
a fellow servant, the court gave judgment for the defendant.
"No reasonable amount of care and supervision," says the
court, "which the master had taken beforehand, would have
guarded against such unexpected and temporary act of negli-
gence. Before an employer should be held responsible in
damages it should appear that in some way, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, he could have avoided the
injury." The decision that a telegraph operator is a fellow
servant of those actively operating the trains settles a question
which has been a mooted one in the Federal courts. The earlier
decisions are in accordance with the present case. Cincinnati
N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Clark, 6 C. C. A. 281; Baltimore & 0.
R. Co. v Camp, 13 C. C. A. 233. The later cases have, however,
shown a tendency to place him in the position of vice-principal.
Hall v. Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co., 39 Fed. x8; -Frost v. Oregon
Short Line & U. N. R. Co., 69 Fed. 936. The weight of authority
in the state courts is distinctly in favor of the present position
of the Supreme Court. Baldwin on American Railroad Law, 252.
Had the decision involved only this point it would have
evoked little controversy, but Justice White, with whom con-
curred the Chief Justice and Justices Harlan and McKenna,
repudiate in vigorous language the assumption that the decision
can be based upon the grounds assumed by the majority.
While admitting the position of the affirmative opinion, so far
as it goes, they insist that the decision rests upon, "first,
whether the train despatcher was a fellow servant of those
operating the train; and, second, if he was not, can the corpora-
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tion avoid liability because the error of the train despatcher was
occasioned by the wrong of the operator." The court, in Balti-
more & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 387, had previously
decided that a train despatcher was a vice principal. Justice
White reviews the previous decisions of the court as to the
second point involved, and summarizes them briefly as follows:
"Where the act is one done in the discharge of positive duty
of the master, negligence in the performance of the act, how-
ever occasioned, is the act of the master and not the act of the
fellow servant." This principle has been recognized by nearly
all the state courts. Sangamore Coal Min. Co. v. Wiggerhaus, 122
Ill. 279; Reid v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 72 Iowa i66;
Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Naole, 55 Kan. 4o; Lyttle v.
Chicago & W. fl' Ry. Co., 84 Mich. 289; McGarry v. N. Y. &H.
R. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 627.
In his dissent, Justice White insists that, if the present rule
is adhered to, a person injured can recover neither under the
broad department and vice-principal theories, for these have
been narrowed by the court, nor where the act complained of is
done by a vice-principal under the present theory, and the act
is one done in pursuance of a positive duty imposed upon the
principal, the result being that the party is remediless. "It
introduces into the doctrine of fellow servant," says the learned
justice, "as hitherto applied in these decisions, a contradiction
which will render it impossible in the future to test the applica-
tion of the rule of fellow servant by any consistent principle."
This would seem to be too strong a statement of the case. The
rule, as established by the decision, seems to be, that the rail-
road company will not be liable where the negligence, though
flowing through the vice-principal, was not primarily his, but
that of a fellow servant of the person injured. Had the negli-
gence been on the part of the vice-principal it can hardly be
doubted that the defendant would have been found liable.
BAGGAGE DISTINGUISHED FROM MERCHANDISE.
The case, Saleeby v. C. R. R. of N. J., 90 N. Y. Supp. 1042,
brings up the question, still an open one, "What constitutes
baggage as distinguished from merchandise?"
This question has never been an easy one to answer. To
give the answer in the form of a definition of the word "bag-
gage" is a difficult matter. Under a given set of circumstances
where suit is brought against a railroad corporation for loss of
a trunk, to say, in endeavoring to determine exactly the plain-
tiff's right, that his claim must be limited to baggage, removes
the difficulty but one short step. We must then face the ques-
tion, "What is baggage?"
The rule on this subject can be stated only in general terms,
and it is for the jury to decide under the facts of each case
what articles come within the rule. Mauritz v. N. Y., etc., R. R.,
23 Fed. 765. There may be cases, of course, where the articles
sought to be recovered for as baggage are clearly not such, as
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where a valise containing nothing but samples of mechandise
was lost, the samples being the property of the principal whose
agent the plaintiff was. Humphreys v. Perry, 148 U. S. 627;
Story, Bailments, 9 th Ed., Sec. 565. Also where $11,250 was
sought to be recovered as baggage. Orange County Bank v.
Brown, 9 Wend. 85. Similarly there may be cases on the other
extreme, where the articles lost are palpably articles of every-
day necessity, such as one is bound to carry on a journey for
personal convenience and comfort. Between these two extremes
there is much room for doubt and hence a vast field for litiga-
tion. The test of baggage generally adopted and followed in
this country is the English test contained in Lord Cockburn's
definition in Macrow v. G. W., etc., R. R., 6 Q. B. 622. Accord-
ing to this definition substantially everything which a passenger
takes with him on a journey for his personal use or convenience
befitting his station in life either with reference to the imme-
diate necessities of the journey or to its ultimate purpose is
baggage.
The first requirement then is that the article sought to be
recovered for as baggage must be carried for the passenger's
personal use or convenience as opposed to his business use or
convenience. So while on the one hand a catalogue, prepared
by the plaintiff for his own use, at his own expense, and which
was his own property, has been held to be baggage (Staub v.
Kendrick, 121 Ind. 226), and while novels carried for diversion
and entertainment have been held to be baggage (Af. C. R. R.
Co. v. Kennedy, 41 Miss. 678), still, on the other hand, printed
matter, in the shape of memoranda, and other papers relating
exclusively to the business of a principal, carried by his agent,
the plaintiff, have been held not to be such. Yazoo & Mf. V. R.
Co. v. G. H. Ins. Co., 37 So. 5oo.
The second requirement of Lord Cockburn's test is that the
articles carried and sought to be recovered for as baggage must
be for the use and convenience of the plaintiff according to his
station in life. In Isaacson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 94 N.
Y. 278, Chief Justice Earl said: "It is agreed on all sides that
it is not easy to draw a well-defined line between what is and
what is not baggage. That which to one traveler would be
indispensable, to another would be unnecessary. One's general
habits must be taken in mind by the carrier when a passenger
is taken for conveyance. And so, if certain articles are
reasonably indispensable to the passenger, although they would
be unnecessary for others, the articles may be recovered for as
baggage, if lost." In the last part of his definition, Lord
Cockburn said that the articles carried might be such as were
proper, considering either the immediate necessities of the
journey or its ultimate object. It was so held in Macrow v.
Western, etc., R. R., supra. In many of the states, this has
been declared to be the law only in part, the right of the
passenger being limited in some jurisdictions to the baggage or
articles required during the journey, and the railroad being
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released from liability for other articles unless they were
accepted by the railroad as baggage. Wilson v. R. R. Co., 56
Me. 62; K. C., P. & G. R. Co. v. State, 65 Ark. 363; R. R. Co. v.
Swift, 12 Wall. 252. In Saleeby v. R. R., supra, articles from
their nature to be classified as merchandise were held to be
baggage through their having been accepted as such by the
railroad with knowledge of their character.
LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN LABOR UNIONS
AND EMPLOYERS.
With the growth of antagonism between labor and capital,
and between union and non-union labor, the courts have been
increasingly called upon to pass upon the validity of contracts
between labor unions and employers. Where the employers
have bound themselves to discharge non-union laborers and hire
none but union men, the question has generally arisen as a
collateral issue in suits brought by the discharged non-union
men against the union men who procured their discharge. But
few cases are recorded wherein the validity of these contracts
has been tested as between the parties themselves. Such was,
however, the question in Jacobs v. Cohen, 90 N. Y. Supp. 854.
The defendants, Cohen & Sons, were sued by Jacobs, president
of a labor union, on a promissory note given by them. The
consideration was a contract by which the defendants bound
themselves to hire none but members of the plaintiff's union
who were in good standing and who produced a pass card from
the union, and agreed to discharge any person whenever the plain-
tiff should notify them that such person was not in good standing.
The defense was lack of consideration, maintaining that the
contract relied upon was unlawful as against public policy.
In Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33. cited by the defense, the
plaintiff sought damages from the defendants for having joined
in a conspiracy to take away his means of earning a livelihood
and prevent him from obtaining employment. The defend-
ants set up a contract to justify their action in causing the
plaintiff to be discharged. The judge in his decision said:
"Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost
freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and
if the purpose of an organization or combination of working-
men is to hamper or to restrict that freedom, and, through
contracts or agreements with employers, to coerce other work-
ingmen to become members of the organization, and to come
under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of
their positions and of deprivation of employment, then that
purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the spirit
of our government and the nature of our institutions " It was
also held that the fact that the contract was entered into for the
purpose of preventing friction between the workingmen's organ-
ization and the employer would not legalize a plan of com-
pelling workingmen not in affiliation with the organization to
join it at the peril of being deprived of their employment.
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In Nat. Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 17o N., Y. 315, it was
decided that a labor union may refuse to permit its members to
work with fellow servants who are members of a rival organiza-
tion and may notify the employei that a strike will be ordered
unless such servants are discharged, when its action is based
upon a proper motive. Such would be a purpose to secure
only the employment of efficient and approved workmen, or to
secure an exclusive preference of employment to members of
the union on their own terms and conditions. If under such
circumstances the employees objected to are discharged,
neither they nor the organization of which they are members
have a right of action against the former union or its members.
From the above case it would be inferred that a contract might
not be enforced, but that if the employer saw fit to carry it out
he could not be enjoined nor could any right of action arise
therefrom.
The above conclusion is upheld by a decision rendered in
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in
December, 1904, MAills v. U. S. Printing Co., 91 N. Y. Supp.
185, where it was held that an employer could not be enjoined
from discharging non-union men in compliance with an agree-
ment to that effect with a union. The theory underlying this
proposition is that the employer has the legal right to discharge
his men unless hired for a definite period, whenever he sees
fit, no matter what his motive for so doing may be. This
theory is followed in England, though the rule there is couched
in much stronger and more comprehensive language. "No
action for conspiracy lies against persons who act in concert to
damage another, and do damage him, but who at the same time
merely exercise their own rights and who infringe no right of
other people." Mogul Steamship Co. v. VcGregor, 23 Q. B.
598; Allen v. Flood, L. R. 1898, A. C. i; Quinn v. Leathem, L. R.
19o, A. C. 495.
In Jacobs v. Cohen, supra, two of the five judges dissented,
Bartlett, J., stating that he could see no reason why a man
should not be allowed to contract to hire only a certain class of
workingmen if he thought it was to his best interest. If by
restricting his right to hire he could procure what he considered
a better class of workingmen and other similar advantages,
especially when no malicious motive is shown, there seems to
be no sound reason why such a contract should not be held
valid, provided its object is primarily the betterment of the
contracting parties. Beach on I onopolies and Ind. Trusts, See.
113. The mere act of discharging non-union employees under
agreement with a labor union is not an actionable wrong, as
shown by the cases cited. No case has been found holding that
the voluntary carrying out of such a contract was in any way
unlawful; hence there seems to be no reason why the parties
could not bind themselves by contract to do that which they
might do of their own volition.
